Initially, EOs 13722 and 13810 designated DPRK IT workers’ overseas deployment and related activities as sanctions targets, prohibiting their provision of software and technical services. However, the Covid-19 pandemic (March 2020–May 2023) led to a surge in remote work, enabling DPRK IT workers to work for U.S. companies remotely. Consequently, since 2022, U.S. government and intelligence agencies have issued a total of four documents, including one guidance and three public service announcements to alert companies to risk indicators and response measures. From 2023 onward, interagency collaboration among the U.S. Departments of Treasury, Justice, and State has intensified, resulting in large-scale sanctions and prosecutions targeting DPRK IT workers and networks.
In March 2024, the United States launched the “DPRK RevGen: Domestic Enabler Initiative,” prioritizing the identification and shutdown of laptop farms. The initiative disclosed multiple law enforcement actions against accomplices hosting laptop farms, DPRK IT workers involved, domains used for illicit employment, and associated revenues. Particularly, from the second half of 2025, large-scale joint law enforcement actions and multiple sanctions targeting DPRK IT workers have been publicly disclosed, reflecting a significant strengthening of U.S. response efforts.
Following the United States, the ROK has been the most active country in responding to DPRK IT worker operations. In December 2022, the ROK issued its first joint government advisory calling for enhanced verification of DPRK IT worker identities. Since then, the ROK has independently designated six entities and individuals associated with DPRK IT workers involved in overseas foreign currency–earning activities as sanctions targets. The ROK and the United States have also coordinated in responding to DPRK IT workers. In April 2023, the two countries jointly designated targets for sanctions for the first time, and to date, there have been three instances of joint target designations. Separately, in October 2023, both countries issued a joint government advisory updating their respective advisories with the latest trends.
In 2024, countries including Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom also joined the international effort by issuing advisories on DPRK IT workers’ disguised employment. This development reflects a growing recognition that the DPRK’s covert employment activities are not merely a foreign currency–earning issue, but also an international security and economic risk. Overall, Figure 1 demonstrates that the principal actors responding to DPRK IT worker operations have expanded from the ROK and the United States to other countries, including those in Europe, highlighting the need for a broader international response framework.
Figure 1 also highlights certain challenges. According to U.S. indictments, DPRK IT workers have been active since at least 2017. Their initial activities were disguised as legitimate employment, which delayed recognition of the associated risks by both the international community and private companies. The figure shows that substantial international responses only began in earnest around 2024.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, as remote work culture expanded, DPRK IT workers found it increasingly easy to participate in overseas corporate projects by posing as third-country workers. During this period, they are also believed to have rapidly enhanced both their technical capabilities and their identity-masking and money-laundering techniques. At the same time, international sanctions enforcement and broader multilateral responses remained largely stagnant, creating a widening gap between North Korea’s evolving methods and the international community’s ability to counter them.
As a result, advisory and sanctions-based responses have inherent limitations. DPRK IT workers are state-sponsored and systematically managed, allowing them to continuously develop innovative techniques and methods. In practice, new identity-masking and technical methods have repeatedly emerged immediately following sanctions. While the United States has combined executive orders, sanctions, prosecutions, and law enforcement actions, these measures alone have had limited effectiveness, as North Korea consistently develops new evasion methods to circumvent sanctions.
Consequently, advisory- and sanctions-based responses alone remain insufficient to fundamentally disrupt DPRK IT worker operations. While detection and response at the company level are important, the burden of identifying and mitigating these threats has largely been placed on individual companies, many of which lack the resources, visibility, or expertise to do so effectively. Moreover, the transnational and adaptive nature of DPRK IT worker networks limits the effectiveness of isolated, reactive measures.
These limitations underscore the need for a more proactive and coordinated approach led by governments. In particular, systematic outreach to domestic companies, structured engagement with international partners, and sustained public-private collaboration are essential to closing existing response gaps. Without stronger government-led efforts to disseminate risk awareness, share intelligence, and align international countermeasures, existing responses will continue to lag behind the evolving tactics of DPRK IT workers.
Government-led Outreach and Coordination to Counter DPRK IT Worker Threats
DPRK IT worker operations are expected to persist through 2026 and continue expanding geographically as enforcement pressure intensifies in the United States. These operations are likely to leverage increasingly sophisticated techniques, including multimodal generative AI—including voice, text, and video deepfakes—to sustain disguised employment. At the same time, cryptocurrency-related companies and other digitally native sectors will remain high-value targets due to their remote work structures and the potential for rapid financial gain.
International sanctions and law enforcement actions have imposed tangible costs on these networks, but they have not fundamentally disrupted DPRK IT worker operations. The adaptive, state-sponsored nature of these activities enables rapid evolution in response to enforcement measures. Reliance on reactive, company-level detection alone places an unsustainable burden on individual companies and creates persistent gaps between emerging threats and effective countermeasures. Addressing these limitations requires a shift toward proactive, government-led outreach and coordination.
Lessons from the Private Sector: Implications for Government Action
Companies face significant structural constraints when disclosing DPRK IT worker incidents. When a company inadvertently hires a DPRK IT worker, the resulting risks extend beyond technical compromise to reputational damage, customer attrition, legal exposure, and contractual liabilities. These factors strongly discourage voluntary disclosure, even when early reporting would benefit the broader ecosystem.
Nevertheless, in 2024, one cybersecurity company publicly disclosed an attempted internal intrusion linked to DPRK IT worker activity. The company documented the full recruitment process—including job postings, interview procedures, and identity verification steps—and immediately shared all relevant data with U.S. cybersecurity firm Mandiant and the FBI to support early-stage investigations. The company also publicly release lessons learned and response measures through its website.
Following the incident, the company conducted organization-wide employee training, implemented fingerprint-based identity verification, and restricted corporate laptop delivery to verified UPS shipments requiring photo identification. In addition, the company published a comprehensive white paper detailing insider-threat risks and preventive controls, and it continued to release updates on DPRK IT worker activity trends.
According to the company’s CEO, the decision to disclose was intended to raise awareness of the widespread nature of DPRK IT worker infiltration attempts and to warn other organizations of comparable risks. By transparently sharing its experience, the company contributed to elevating industry-wide security standards while reinforcing customer trust.
However, such best practices remain fragmented across jurisdictions and sectors, making comprehensive access difficult for most companies—particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises. This fragmentation highlights the limitations of relying solely on voluntary private sector disclosure. Accordingly, governments should assume a more active role in collecting, standardizing, and disseminating these lessons through sustained outreach efforts.
Centralized Information Sharing and Institutional Verification Frameworks
Governments already possess extensive intelligence related to DPRK cyber operations and IT worker networks, yet this information often fails to reach companies in a usable and timely manner. To close this gap, the ROK government should centrally aggregate and disseminate both best practices and DPRK IT worker–specific indicators—including email addresses, recurring account naming patterns, profile photos, commonly cited education and career information, and IP addresses associated with laptop farms.
Rather than creating new mechanisms, existing government–private sector information-sharing platforms focused on DPRK cyber threats should be expanded to incorporate these indicators. Centralization would significantly lower access barriers, enabling companies of all sizes to integrate this information directly into recruitment screening, identity verification, and internal security training processes.
In parallel, the ROK should consider establishing an institutional employment-eligibility and identity verification framework analogous to the U.S. I-9 and E-Verify systems. In the United States, these mechanisms have been used not only to confirm work authorization, but also to flag identity inconsistencies and third-country impersonation patterns relevant to DPRK IT worker investigations. A comparable system in the ROK would provide companies with an additional safeguard when pre-employment screening fails.
Reporting, Incentives, and Enforcement Mechanisms
Timely reporting remains critical to preventing escalation and secondary harm once DPRK IT worker activity is detected. However, incentives alone are unlikely to overcome companies’ reluctance to disclose incidents. A dual-track framework combining legal protections and meaningful penalties is therefore required to make reporting the rational choice rather than concealment.
The government should provide whistleblower protections and limited liability safeguards for companies that report suspicious activity promptly. At the same time, penalties—including increased fines—should be strengthened for companies that knowingly or negligently employ DPRK IT workers or fail to report suspicious indicators within a defined time frame. Enforcement should also extend to operational enablers, such as laptop farm operators and intermediaries who facilitate overseas employment and financial flows, as these actors are essential to sustaining DPRK IT worker networks.
International Outreach and the ROK’s Strategic Leadership
Although remote work is less prevalent in the ROK than in many Western economies, the country faces unparalleled national security exposure due to its geographic proximity to North Korea. This position confers both heightened risk and a unique responsibility to lead international awareness and coordination efforts.
Recent reporting indicates that DPRK IT worker activity has increased across Europe, where remote work adoption remains high and threat awareness comparatively low. The ROK should proactively engage European partners to emphasize that weak awareness in remote work environments can escalate into broader national and economic security risks. Similar outreach is warranted in Southeast Asia, Africa, and other regions where awareness remains limited.
In parallel, bilateral cooperation between the ROK and the United States—as well as trilateral coordination with Japan—should continue through regular advisories, working-level exchanges, and joint statements. Given the increasingly blurred line between DPRK IT workers and overtly malicious cyber actors, a new joint advisory emphasizing the growing use of direct exfiltration and intrusion tactics would reinforce shared threat perception and strengthen collective deterrence.
Ultimately, countering DPRK IT worker operations requires more than cooperation—it requires leadership. By centralizing information, institutionalizing verification mechanisms, incentivizing reporting, and proactively engaging international partners, the ROK can move from a reactive participant to a global agenda-setter in addressing this evolving threat.
Yena Kim is a senior researcher on the Cybersecurity Policy Research Team at the National Security Research Institute in the Republic of Korea. Donghee Kim is a senior researcher and manager of the Cybersecurity Policy Research Team at the National Security Research Institute in the Republic of Korea.
This report is made possible through support from the National Security Research Institute (NSR) of Korea. CSIS and NSR conducted scholarly research on U.S.-ROK cyber resilience. The analysis presented here was independently authored by researchers at NSR.
